

In our experiment, we gained up to 61% accuracy on our unprotected dataset, 54% on our WTF-PAD dataset, and 43% on our Walkie-Talkie dataset using only timing-based features in an SVM classifier. In this paper, we examine the extent to which packet timing can be used to facilitate WF attacks. This was reasonable given that previous research on WF attacks ignored or deemphasized the use of packet timing information. Defenses such as Walkie-Talkie mainly remove features related to bursts of traffic without affecting packet timing. Recent WF attacks on Tor have reached high enough accuracy (up to 98%) to prompt Tor to consider adopting defenses based on packet padding. Website Fingerprinting (WF) enables an eavesdrop-per to discover what sites the user is visiting despite the use of a VPN or even the Tor anonymity system.
